Are the markets discounting a V-shaped recovery? Or does the evidence advise this is still a bear store rally akin to those of the 1930s and 1970s?
Ah, V-shaped recovery, how we doubt thee. Let us count the ways...
Trickle Up Poverty
But first, let's note something about how to make money in markets. (Because, really, that's what this is all about, right?)
Just as there are many company models that victorious fellowships follow, there are many profitable paths up the store mountain. But one of the most time-tested, trustworthy ways to do well in markets over time is establishing a large position (often after testing the waters with small positions)... Riding that position to vast gains... And then protecting those gains when the store turns.
Simple, right? It's easier said than done, of course. There is a fair amount that goes into it. But that's the gist.
And given that gist, one might say the trader or investor's job record falls into four categories:
o Minimizing losses on positions that aren't working.
o Maximizing gains on profitable open positions (knowing when to add to the position).
o Protecting gains when a vast body of profits has accrued.
o retention an eye out for the next big venture or trade.
This roster of responsibilities highlights why we are at such a needful juncture.
For those who have ridden the 2009 rally to major gains, the dilemma is either to protect open profits with a hedge (akin to buying fire assurance on one's portfolio)... either to "take some off the table" and partially cash out... Or either to cash out entirely. (Notwithstanding the fourth choice of naturally "letting it ride.")
For those who are not sitting on long-side profits (and even for those who are), a key query is where the next big round of chance will come from. Will it be on the upside... Or the downside? Will it be in "risk-loving" assets (more of the same)... Or "anti-risk" assets (a turn from the status quo)? How soon might the turn arrive?
From a practical perspective, these questions highlight the importance of the "what's next" question. So now, without supplementary ado, let's take a closer look at some reasons to doubt the V-shaped wisdom.
Reason to Doubt #1: Parallels to 1930
"There's a large amount of money on sidelines waiting for venture opportunities; this should be felt in store when "cheerful sentiment is more firmly intrenched [sic]." Economists point out that banks and assurance fellowships "never before had so much money lying idle."
Sound familiar? The above headline feels like 2009, but is authentically vintage 1930 (courtesy of the "News from 1930" Web site).
Those who take the gift rally as incontrovertible evidence of a V-shaped salvage are forgetting something important. Investors in 1930 brimmed with a similar doomed confidence.
Comparing today's post-crash move to the one back then, fund employer John Hussman notes that "the store recovered by an roughly same percentage following the 1929 crash, peaking in April 1930, after which it suffered a subsequent decline to fresh lows."
The point is not to say today looks just like 1930, Hussman goes on to add, but rather to point out that, when it comes to economic salvage prospects, a giant rally doesn't prove that much at all.
Reason to Doubt #2: The Biggest Rallies Are Bear store Rallies
From Monday's Wall street Journal:
Rarely has the stock store seen a six-month rally like the one it just turned in. The Dow Jones industrial Average's 46% surge was one of just six of that magnitude in the last 100 years. And that is exactly what worries many analysts.
All former rallies of this magnitude took place in the 1930s and the 1970s, according to Ned Davis Research. Those were periods of turbulence for both the cheaper and the markets, and none of the gains was sustained.
Many analysts believe that stocks are again in such a turbulent period, and that this rally could lead to someone else slump. Stocks did enjoy a rally of 40% in 1982, at the start of a long-running duration of stock-market prosperity. That rally wasn't of the same magnitude of the others, however. It came as economic troubles, notably inflation, were ultimately being squeezed out of the economy.
Reason to Doubt #3: It Still Ain't 1982
In a Taipan Daily piece some months back titled "This Ain't 1982," we noted the many reasons why the gift environment looks nothing at like that of the early 1980s.
In a nutshell, 1982 was the starter year for a 25-year upswing in leverage and credit. Fed Chairman Paul Volcker had just "broken the back of inflation" (at a cost of great economic hardship) and America was on the cusp of the longest debt binge (among consumers, businesses and government) in all of recorded history.
At the same time, consumer savings rates went into a steady decline, from double-digit division rates to below zero, as America shopped and shopped. Meanwhile, decades of aggressive financial innovation (under a complacent Alan Greenspan) led to the creation of the "shadow banking system," a quasi-official means of pumping the cheaper full of even more leverage and prestige by way of venture banks, secret venture pools and so on.
Now we are at the tail end of all that. After a quarter-century of build-up, a great "deleveraging" is at hand. The consumer is flat on his back, the shadow banking principles lies in shambles, and consumer entrance to prestige has gone from a flood to a trickle.
Reason to Doubt #4: The Megabanks Are Just as Rotten as Ever
Every year the World Economic Forum (Wef) releases its yearly "Global Competitiveness Report." Among the assorted factors thought about by the Wef is the soundness of a country's banks. By this quantum America ranked 108th, a spot behind Tanzania. One could arguably have more reliance development a deposit at the Bank of Burundi than many institutions in the U.S. Or the U.K.
And in spite of the hundreds of billions (trillions?) poured in via backstops, guarantees and cash injections, some of the major banks still look like ticking time bombs. For instance: Dick Bove, a long-respected banking examiner with decades of taste on the street, has described present-day Wells Fargo as a "volcano, with a amount of tremors, that is possibly about to blow."
The new Wells Fargo concern traces back to the big Wachovia merger (a failing bank that Wells swallowed up). In taking on Wachovia, it turns out, Wells Fargo may also have gulped down a amount of live hand grenades in the form of unhedged and unaccounted-for derivatives trades. Surprise surprise, Wells Fargo's management has turned out to be less than forthright about this troubling exposure.
That's just the tip of the iceberg. The real problem is, the banks haven't changed much at all... The only material difference, in fact, is that the big have gotten bigger. Tens of trillions of dollars' worth of unstable derivative contracts are still concentrated in untrustworthy hands. And as the newest Wells Fargo concerns demonstrate, the megabanks have been anything but forthright.
With the blessings of the Fed and Treasury, the megabanks' strategy has been to use every accounting trick in the book to gift the appearance of big profits - most of those profits created by way of government bailout funds - while simultaneously burying the remaining toxic time bombs as deep in the balance sheet as possible.
This "play for time" strategy hinges entirely on the hope that nothing else will blow up before the patchwork of quick fixes finds time to work. It is, in other words, one hundred percent company as usual.
Reason to Doubt #5: Hundreds More Banks Will Fail
As of this writing, 94 banks have failed in 2009. Banking examiner Meredith Whitney (who gained fame for calling the collapse of Citigroup in advance) has said she expects at least 300 banks to fail. Institutional Risk Analytics, one of the top bank-analyst services in the country, expects more than 1,000 banks to fail over the course of the cycle.
Banks provide prestige to consumers and businesses straight through the form of mortgage loans, auto loans, prestige card loans and the like. When banks fail, prestige contracts, development it harder for consumers to spend and businesses to stay afloat. Lowered spending as a result of reduced prestige then leads to more layoffs and lost jobs in a vicious circle. The vicious circle completes itself as banks pull back even supplementary in a tough economy.
Not only are hundreds more banks set to fail, the Fdic (Federal Deposit assurance Corporation) is on the verge of a public relations disaster as it runs out of money. There is no way the Fdic will be able to handle all these failures. Based on their projections, Institutional Risk Analytics thinks the Fdic could be on the hook for 0 billion-0 billion if not more. (And that's not even taking into list a fresh megabank debacle, like a Wells Fargo blow-up).
Where in the world is the Fdic going to get 0 billion? As John Mauldin writes,
The Fdic can borrow 0 billion in an emergency line of credit, and straight through 2010 it can get someone else 0 billion. But if and when that money is borrowed, it will have to be paid back. Remember the money that was lost in the savings and loan emergency 20 years ago? The Fdic had to borrow a mere billion. We are still paying that 30-year loan back.
If the Fdic is forced to borrow from the Treasury, Congress (and America's creditors) will scream bloody murder. One alternative, as Mauldin supplementary notes, is for the Fdic to leverage more "special fees" against the banks.
But guess what? If the Fdic tries to squeeze blood from a stone in terms of hitting up the banks, that will cause the surviving banks to pull in their horns even further... To lend even less. This is someone else heart attack waiting to happen for consumer prestige and small company prestige - in an cheaper 70% driven by consumer spending and largely powered by small businesses.
Reason to Doubt #6: The Housing Bubble Has Not Yet Fully Burst
U.S. Mortgage delinquencies set a new record in July, with 7.58% of mortgages (roughly one out of 13) at least 30 days late on payments. according to Reuters and Equifax, subprime mortgage delinquencies have hit a whopping 41%.
And now the banks have to worry about a new problem: "Strategic Defaulters." As the Los Angeles Times reports,
Who is more likely to walk away from a house and a mortgage - a person with super-prime prestige scores or person with lower scores?
Research using a weighty sample of 24 million private prestige files has found that homeowners with high scores when they apply for a loan are 50% more likely to "strategically default" - right away and intentionally pull the plug and abandon the mortgage - compared with lower-scoring borrowers.
The La Times reports there were more than half a million (588,000) "strategic defaulters" nationwide in 2008.
These are individuals with high prestige ratings who technically have the financial wherewithal to continue development payments on their mortgage, but naturally do not see the logic of pumping money into a more or less permanently-upside down asset.
The thinking runs something like: "Why throw good money after bad in terms of staying committed to a house worth 0,000 less than I paid for it, when the penalty for walking away (damaged credit) will hurt less than throwing time to come wage into a hole for 10 or 20 years."
Meanwhile, Iowa attorney general Tom Miller recently went on record saying "Payment choice Arms [adjustable rate mortgages] are about to explode... That's the next round of potential foreclosures in our country."
Homeowners and banks have only just begun to wrestle with the mortgage "reset" problem, in which monthly payments due suddenly double or triple (or worse) based on fine-print deadlines. As the choice Arm qoute gets serious, look for the amount of "strategic defaulters" to shoot even higher.
That's more horrible news for the already struggling banks... And no wonder previously mentioned forecaster Meredith Whitney think home prices could fall someone else 25% before hitting bottom.
Reason to Doubt #7: Uncle Sam Is a Borrowing Fiend
If you understanding America was a "borrow and spend" nation before, you ain't seen nothin' yet. The past four quarters have dwarfed all former U.S. Government borrowing efforts, and that is a trend that's guaranteed to continue.
What probably won't continue, however, is the Federal Reserve's capability to buy hundreds of billions worth of U.S. Treasuries directly - effectively "monetizing" the debt - without foremost to either 1) an eventual collapse in the U.S. Dollar or 2) an eventual collapse in bond prices and subsequent sharp rise in interest rates. We are headed for an environment of heavier regulations, higher taxes, and more government operate of the cheaper at a time when we can least afford it, and plunging headlong into the debt abyss to pay for it all.
Reason to Doubt #8: Black Boxes and Punk Volume
Finally, a big think to doubt this rally is the troubling lack of volume. Bull markets are typically characterized by wholesome and rising volume trends as more and more investors decide to partake in the market. But that is not what we are finding here.
Instead, share trading has been dominated by quants, high frequency trading (Hft) shops, and other "black box" type outfits rather than more legitimate buying sources. Not only that, but volume has been alarmingly concentrated in a handful of super-speculative stocks. Reuters recently reported that, over a week's worth of trading, a full 40% of trading volume came from just four (!) heavily traded names: Bank of America (Bac), Citigroup (C), Fannie Mae (Fnm) and Freddie Mac (Fre).
So not only are we finding suspiciously low volume when these super-speculative names are weeded out (Citigroup - 491 million shares per day midpoint volume!), we are finding heavy operation from quants and other "black box" type trading systems, with the bulk of operation concentrated in the most casino-oriented corners of the market.
These are a few (but by no means all) of the reasons why your humble editor tips a hat to the mania, yet continues to doubt.
7 Reasons to Doubt the V-Shaped saving